The UAE and the Iranian Threat

In a recent speech on Aspen Colorado, Ambassador Yousef al-Otaiba said he would fully support a preemptive strike against Iranian nuclear facilities. He said:

I think it's a cost-benefit analysis. I think despite the large amount of trade we do with Iran, which is close to $12 billion … there will be consequences, there will be a backlash and there will be problems with people protesting and rioting and very unhappy that there is an outside force attacking a Muslim country; that is going to happen no matter what.

If you are asking me, 'Am I willing to live with that versus living with a nuclear Iran?,' my answer is still the same: 'We cannot live with a nuclear Iran.' I am willing to absorb what takes place at the expense of the security of the UAE.

Supposedly this shocked some, but quite to the contrary it shouldn't. As I mentioned earlier in this blog, an Iranian nuke would have dire effects in the region. Not only does Israel have serious concerns about such a development, but the Gulf states have also to worry that a nuclear Iran would be a nation able to impose its will on the smaller countries in the region and in so doing be able to control what those nations did in terms of economic and foreign policy. It is no wonder that the UAE ambassador voiced such an opinion. He, though, is most likely not alone. More likely than not officials from Oman and Bahrain feel the same way that a nuclear Iran will act as a regional bully and that they are willing to put up with any protests that may result if their security is threatened. Why the Obama Administration does not understand this concern is beyond belief. If Iran was to go nuclear the US would have to also be prepared to intervene for those nations should Iran threaten them. It seems President Obama just doesn't understand all the consequences.

Not surprisingly this story was under-reported in the media this week and I only heard about it from Charles Krauthammer on Friday's edition of Special Report with Brett Baeir.

Neconservatism: The Biography of a Movement (Book Review)

Justin Vaisse's book, Neoconservatism: The Biography of a Movement, proved to be a fair-minded and educational read on the movement that has garnered much attention in the last decade.

Vaisse explains the history in a very linear, chronological fashion so as to explain exactly how it developed and who helped it get there. Other authors, when discussing the topic, don't do this, but he explains this method is the best in his introduction. What he does in the book though is explains that neoconservatism can be divided into three distinct ages. The first age which took place in the 1960s and was compromised of Irving Kristol, Nathan Glazer, Norman Podhoretz, and Daniel Patrick Moynihan. In this phase it primarily addressed domestic issues in the pages of The Public Interest and was a reaction against the New Left and the protests it inspired on campuses some of these men taught at. It must also be noted that a good portion of these men such as Kristol were former Trotskyists at City College of New York.

It was in the second age when foreign policy started to become its primary concern. In fact many second age and third age neoconservatives overlap. This group of people, including luminaries such as Richard Perle, Elliot Abrams, and Paul Wolfowitz were greatly inspired by Senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson (D-WA) and the nuclear strategist Albert Wohlstetter. Their primary concern was opposition to Henry Kissinger's detente and a desire to maintain military dominance over the Soviet Union. The strong support for Israel, which is characteristic of neoconservatives also began here.

In the third age, which is said to have started in 1995, Bill Kristol and Robert Kagan are to said to have made their names known. Although many second age neocons are active in this phase, it was here that such institutions as the Project for the New American Century and The Weekly Standard began under the direction of Bill Kristol and where they came to occupy places of influence in the Bush Administration. Vaisse makes sure to be fair to the neocons when discussing this phase and not lay all the blame for the Iraq War at their feet as some do. Even though he is fair, he does take them to task for having a narrow view of what it would take to make their vision succeed. He does not go overboard in doing so, but rather gives the movement constructive criticism.

Overall I can say the book is well-written and fair on top of being very informative. He lays out precisely what compromises the current neoconservative vision of foreign policy and through his narrative gives the reader a well-informed idea of how they developed it and who contributed to it. He dispels some alleged "myths" about neoconservatism as well. He says that despite what some authors say, philosopher Leo Strauss did not have an that much of an influence on future neocons. This of course can be disputed depending on who you are discussing. For the neoconservatives though, he ends the book on a high note. He says that despite the road bumps that the movement has encountered of late that it in fact is not dead, far from it in fact. It has ingratiated itself into influential think tanks such as American Enterprise Institute and the Hudson Institute as well as being the chosen foreign policy of the Republican party and conservative movement in general and as a result will return to influence world affairs in the future.